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Negotiation and Settlement in
Nagorno-Karabak: Maintaining
Territorial Integrity or Promoting
Self-Determination?
Argam DerHartunian*
The little-known region of Nagorno-Karabakh,' known to Armenians as
Artsakh, has been no stranger to conflict. 2 This land, nestled in the historic
"Armenian Plateau," has been ruled by many different dynasties and seen
the faces of many different ethnicities and cultures. 3 Today, both Armeni-
ans and Azeris claim an absolute historic right to Nagorno-Karabakh, peri-
odically fighting over the region.4 Although the intense fighting ended in
1994, negotiation efforts regarding the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh re-
main stalemated. This has caused the leaders of Karabakh to declare the re-
gion an independent republic, although no state, including Armenia, has rec-
ognized this status.
5
The territorial dispute between the Armenians and Azeris is centered
upon the war of 1991-1994, which resulted in Armenian military control of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas.
6
Continued occupation or release of these territories forms a key asset to
the Armenian side in its attempts to prioritize the determination of Na-
gom[o]-Karabakh's future status as a precondition for dialogue on other is-
* Argam DerHartunian is a recent graduate of Pepperdine University School of Law where he re-
ceived his J.D. and a certificate in Dispute Resolution. He spent the Summer of 2006 in Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh working for the United States Agency for International Development.
1The words Nagorno-Karabakh and Karabakh will be used interchangeably throughout this article.
2 See Wikipedia, Nagomo-Karahakh, http://en. Wikipedia.org/wiki/Nargomo-Karabakh (last visited
Sept. 16, 2006).
3 See Wikipedia, supra note 2.
4 See PATRICIA CARLEY, NAGORNO-KARABAKH: SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION (1998),
http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks25/chapl-125.html.
5 See CARLEY, supra note 4.
6 See Broers, Laurence, The Limits of Leadership: Elites and Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh
Peace Process (2005), at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagomy-karabakh/introduction.php.
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sues. It has thus proved impossible to disentangle negotiations over the con-
sequences of armed conflict from the substantive issues underlying it. 7 Ne-
gotiations and mediation efforts have solely revolved around the status of the
region; however, "Armenia and Azerbaijan remain divided on vital points.
Azerbaijan does not accept any compromise of its territorial integrity, nor
does it agree that Nagorno-Karabakh's population alone can vote on deter-
mining its final status."
' 8
This article will attempt to trace the origins of the region, and most no-
tably outline the recent conflict which erupted in 1991 continuing with the
negotiation and settlement attempts after the 1994 cease-fire agreement.
Furthermore, this article will humbly try to analyze the causes of the conflict
and suggest new mediation methods that might lead to a fair and just agree-
ment to this conflict. This will be no easy task because the conflict is deeply
rooted with a long history of conflict between these two peoples. Therefore,
the first objective will be to trace the history of the conflict while outlining
the current status of the conflict and the parties involved. The second objec-
tive will be to summarize and analyze past mediation efforts. Finally, this
article will attempt to suggest an equitable means to achieve a remedy to the
conflict. The focus of this article has been purposely kept narrow to facili-
tate an easy understanding of the conflict and provide sufficient background
to those unfamiliar with the dispute.
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS NAGORNO-KARABAKH?
Nagorno-Karabakh ("Karabakh") is a region of Azerbaijan, in the South
Caucasus, located about 270 km (about 170 mi.) west of the Azerbaijani
capital of Baku. 9 The region currently has a population of approximately
145,000 people, of whom 95 percent are ethnic Armenians. 10 The area is
known for its green rugged beauty, its wild mountains, and its isolation from
to the rest of the Caucasus. 1
Origins of Nagorno-Karabakh
Tracing the origins of Nagorno-Karabakh is difficult because little his-
torical record exists in the region. However, it has been widely accepted that
7 See Broers, supra note 6.
8 Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace, International Crisis Group,, Crisis Group Eur. Report No.
167 at 3 (October 11, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/
europe/caucasus/167_nagomo_karabakh_a_plan-for peace.pdf.
9 See infra App. Fig. 1.
'o See Wikipedia, supra note 2.
" See Wikipedia, supra note 2.
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the people who first inhabited in this region were the people of the Kura-
Araxes culture. The region of Karabakh and most of eastern Transcauca-
sia was then inhabited by a people called Albanians, not to be confused with
the people of the same name now living in the Balkans.' 3 This area was
highly disputed at times being part Aghbania, or Caucasian Albania, and at
other times, of Greater Armenia.14 Ti~ranes II, ruler of the Kingdom of
Armenia conquered the land in 95 B.C. Shortly after the Armenians con-
verted to Christianity in 301 A,D, the Albanians too adopted the Armenian
brand of Christianity.16 As a result of this adoption, Albanians soon started
losing their own identity and began to slowly merge with the Armenian
population. This resulted in the loss of a separate culture of the Caucasian
Albanians by the 7th century, establishing Armenians as the majority popula-
tion in the region. 18
In the seventh and eighth centuries much of Karabakh was conquered by
Arabs, who converted a portion of the population to Islam. 19  Karabakh
passed to Imperial Russia by the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, before the rest
of Transcaucasia was incorporated into the Empire in 1828 by the Treaty of
Turkmenchai. 2 ° In 1822, the Karabakh Khanate was dissolved, and the area
became part of the Russian province that later formed Azerbaijan. 2 1
Nagorno-Karabakh After 1917
Representatives of the Armenians, Georgians and Azeris met and
formed a short-lived Transcaucasian Federation. However, this federation
failed and three separate independent republics were established: Armenia,
12 See Wikipedia, supra note 2.
13 See SVANTE E. CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS AND GREAT POWERS: A STUDY OF ETHNOPOLITICAL
CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS 66 (2001) [hereinafter CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS].
14id.
15 Id.
16 See Hye Etch, Religion and Church, http://www.hyeetch.nareg.com.au/religion/index.html (last
visited Sep. 16, 2006).
17 See Gerard Libaridian, Pre-Soviet History of Karabakh, http://www.cilicia.com/armol9i.html (last
visited Sep. 16, 2006).
' See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 13.
'9 Nina Garsian, The Arab Invasions and the Rise of Bagratuni (640-884), in THE ARMENIAN
PEOPLE FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 125 (Richard G. Hovannisian ed. 1997).
20 TIM PORTIER, CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH, ABKHAZIA, AND SOUTH OSSETIA: A LEGAL
APPRAISAL 1 (2001).
21 id.
22 See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 13, at 70.
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Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 23 Azerbaijan claimed sovereignty over Karabakh,
and sought to secure its claims with help from the Ottoman Empire. 24 The
Allies decided that the ultimate status of Karabakh was to be determined at
the Paris Peace Conference. 25 While Azerbaijan applauded this decision as
recognition of its territorial rights over the region, the Armenian side criti-
cized this decision arguing it was motivated by the Allies' economic inter-
ests in the oil fields near Azerbaijan's capital, Baku. 26
In 1920 all of the Trans-Caucasian nations were taken over by the Bol-
sheviks.2 7 Given the sudden takeover and the uncertainty of the status of the
regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan, the borders between Azer-
28baijan, Armenia, and Georgia were not immediately determined. On
March 16, 1921, a treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union established
that Karabakh would be under the authority of the Azerbaijani Soviet Social-
ist Republic. 29 In 1924, Karabakh was granted status as an autonomous
oblast. -3 Stalin's main strategy was to prevent any one ethnic group from
gaining enough power and autonomy to secede from soviet rule; therefore,
he implemented policies which split Armenian nation to different regions of
the Caucuses.
3
'
Eruption of Violence in Karabakh
As tensions built up in the Soviet Union while Gorbachev was enacting
his glasnost policies, the gradual dissolution of the Soviet Union gave way to
Karabakh's aims at independence. In 1988, the Armenian majority in the
Nagorno-Karabakh Supreme Soviet (the region's legislature) appealed to
have the region join Armenia. Violence erupted, and each side claimed that
the other had initiated the hostilities. In 1989, Soviet authorities granted
Azerbaijan more leeway to control the region. The Supreme Soviet of Ar-
menia reacted by passing a resolution proclaiming the unification of Na-
gomo-Karabakh and Armenia. Azerbaijan, in response to the movement for
23 See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 13, at 71.
24 PORTIER, supra note 20, at 2.
25 id.
26 Id. at 3.
27 Id.
29 id.
29 Id.
30 Svante E. Comell, Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered, JOURNAL OF
SOUTH ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES VOL. XX, No. 4, SUMMER 1997, 2,
http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/comell-pub/ main-doc.pdf Autonomous oblasts have less auton-
omy than autonomous republics in the structure of the Soviet Union. Id.
3' FRANK NORTHEN MAGILL, GREAT EVENTS OF HISTORY II 2349 (1992).
32 See CARLEY, supra note 4.
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unification, started pogroms against Armenians in cities with large Arme-
nian populations.
33
In the spring of 1991, serious fi3hting erupted in Karabakh involving
Armenian, Azeri, and Soviet troops. After the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the autonomous region of Karabakh declared complete independence
in early 1992. 35 During this escalation of the conflict, military action be-
tween Azerbaijan and Armenia was heavily influenced by the Russian mili-
tary. 36 Many allege that Russian military forces inspired and manipulated
the rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan, providing weapons to both
sides in order to weaken each state and maintain control over the region.
37
By mid-1992, the Armenians largely controlled Nagorno-Karabakh, many of
the Azeris that lived there had left, and the Lachin corridor, a land bridge
from the region to Armenia, was established. 38 By 1993 there were thou-
sands of casualties and refuges on both sides.3 9 Furthermore, Armenian
forces managed to occupy almost 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory outside
of Karabakh.40
In 1994, by the mediation efforts of Russia and pressure from the UN
Security Council, Azerbaijan and Armenia reached a cease-fire agreement. 4 1
Since the cease-fire agreement, the situation has been stalemated; however,
occasional eruptions of violence do occur within the region.4 2 Karabakh
remains an independent republic with its own government and elections;
nevertheless, the governments of Armenia and Karabakh remain closely tied
33 Mark Saroyan,The 'Karabakh Syndrome' and Azerbaijani Politics, in MINORITIES, MULLAHS AND
MODERNITY: RESHAPING COMMUNITY IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 175 (Edward W. Walker ed.
1997).
" See THOMAS GOLTZ, AZERBAIJAN DIARY: A ROGUE REPORTER'S ADVENTURES IN AN OIL-RICH,
WAR-TORN, POST-SOVIET REPUBLIC 75 (1998).
35 JAMES B MINAHAN, MINIATURE EMPIRES: A HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEWLY
INDEPENDENT STATES 13 (1998).
36 DONALD E. MILLER ET AL., ARMENIA 70 (2003).
37 id.
38 LEOKADIA M DROBIZHEVA, ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE POST-SOVIET WORLD: CASE STUDIES AND
ANALYSIS 247 (1996).
3' KEVIN BOYLE & JULIET SHEEN, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: WORLD REPORT 272 (1997).
41 MICHAEL P. CROISSANT, THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS 133
(1998).
41 Volker Jacoby, The Role of the OSCE: An Assessment of International Mediation Efforts, in THE
LIMITS OF LEADERSHIP: ELITES AND SOCIETIES IN THE NAGORNY KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS (Laur-
ence Broers ed. 2005) available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-karabak/osce-
role.php.
42 Personal knowledge of the author.
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with Karabakh using the currency and many of the resources of Armenia. 43
Armenia is hesitant to recognize Karabakh as an independent state or to sup-
port unification fearing backlash from the international community - notably
Turkey and Azerbaijan.44 This situation remains volatile until a firm resolu-
tion to the conflict is agreed upon by all parties.45
PLAYERS IN THE NEGOTIATION TALKS
Primary Parties
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenia is a small nation-state almost the size of Maryland. 46  It is
purely a diasporan nation with more ethnic Armenians living outside the
state than inside- namely in Russia, the United States, and Europe. 47 Dias-
poran Armenians contribute money and time to the growth of Armenia and
support the independence of Karabakh.4 8 Armenia emerged as a democracy
after it proclaimed independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.49 It has
been applauded as the most democratic nation in the region, although allega-
tions of voter fraud plague every election and corruption is rampant amongst
government officials.N Furthermore, instances of censorship have been
documented: "[t]he Armenian government continues to use its powers to
limit political activity, restricting freedom of assembly and persecuting those
that it perceives as a threat to its hold on power."
51
43 Personal knowledge of the author.
44 Personal knowledge of the author.
41 Personal knowledge of the author.
46 CIA-THE WORLD FACTBOOK: ARMENIA, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/am.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
47 Armenia Diaspora Conference Official Site,
http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/followup/population.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
48 See GOLTZ, supra note 34, at 314.
4' LEONIDAS T. CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, CAUCASUS CHRONICLES: NATION-BUILDING AND
DIPLOMACY IN ARMENIA, 1993-1994, at 3 (2004).
50 Emil Danielyan, Corruption Remains Pervasive in Armenia, Despite Two-Year Anti-Graft Cam-
paign, EURASIANET, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departmentsibusiness/articles/
eavl I 1005.shtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
"' Human Rights Watch, EU-South Caucasus: Concrete Human Rights Benchmarks Needed,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/09/azerbal2l77.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2006) [hereinafter
EU-South Caucasus].
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Armenia, by forces beyond its control, has had to establish alliances
with Iran and Russia to maintain its security in the region and Karabakh.
52
Armenia's alliance with the United States has been complicated by the
Karabakh conflict because the United States has tried to secure its oil inter-
ests in the region while trying to satisfy the large Armenian-American con-
stituency in the United States. Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act is an
example of this complicated relationship. 53 While the executive department
favors Azerbaijan in the conflict, Congress has partially sided with Armenia
because of the Armenian-American lobbying efforts. Recently, Armenia
has had no choice but to openly ally itself with Iran and Russia, which might
lead to a deterioration of relations with the United States; however, given the
efforts of the Armenian-American constituency in the United States this will
be a difficult relationship to fully sever.55
Armenia has a long history in the Caucuses and a rich history of Christi-
56
anity. The ethnic Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire suffered the
first genocide of the 2 0 th Century in 1915 per etrated by the "Young Turk"
government on Armenian historic homeland. Turkey to this day denies
that a systematic genocide took place despite international pressure to rec-
ognize the fact. 58 Therefore, Armenia and Turkey have held an antagonistic
relationship mainly due to this sensitive issue and the Diaspora's insistence
to keep it on the agenda. Turkey has maintained a blockade of Armenia
damaging Armenia's economy and not allowing the infant nation to grow
and prosper. Despite this, Armenia has made some economic progress
52 See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 13, at 394.
53 See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 32, at 377. The executive department has expressed its
view on Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Former Secretary of State Albrights' advisor Ste-
peh Sestanovich has stated:
Section 907 remains a serious obstacle to our diplomacy in Azerbaijan... Politically, Section
907 and related provisions are an impediment to our making progress on Nagorno-Karabakh,
to our ability to work effectively with Azerbaijan on the east-west Eurasian transport corridor,
to advancing in Azerbaijan the same reforms we have support in other NIS countries, and to
the ability of United States firms to do business sin Azerbaijan.
Id. This clearly illustrates the mixed policies of the White House and Congress.
51 See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 32, at 377.
" See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 32, at 394.56 See, e.g., MARK CHAHIN, THE KINGDOM OF ARMENIA: A HISTORY (2001).
17 Roger W. Smith, The Armenian Genocide: Memory, Politics and the Future, in THE ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE: HISTORY, POLITICS, ETHICS I (Richard G. Hovannisian ed., 1992).
58 PETER BALAKIAN, THE BURNING TIGRIS: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND AMERICA'S RESPONSE,
xxiii (2004).
301
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through the help and financial support of the Armenian Diaspora and has
maintained double digit growth for six years.59
Karabakh mainly provides sentimental value to Armenia and influence
over the region; there are no valuable resources in Karabakh that would
benefit Armenia, nor does it provide access to untapped foreign markets.
Furthermore, Armenia is faced with the struggle of keeping its state and na-
tion together-this has been the first time since the short lived independent
Armenian republic of 1918-1920 that Armenians have had an independent
republic in Karabakh. 60 However, as stated above, Karabakh holds a long
history of Armenian presence. 61 The governments of Armenia and Kara-
bakh are intertwined in many ways and work as one unit rather than two.
Armenia, therefore, has great interest in keeping the territories gained in the
war since they have contributed much capital toward its redevelopment.
Protecting the legal status and individual rights of the people of Kara-
bakh is a major concern of Armenia and Karabakh. The Armenian popula-
tion of Azerbaijan has been subject to persecution and various pogroms
throughout the twentieth century. If Karabakh were to fall back into the
hands of Azerbaijan there is a strong likelihood that the Armenians of the
region would again face great persecution and treatment as second-class citi-
zens. The long history of discrimination against Armenians in Azerbaijan,
coupled with the recent conflict, suggests that an Azerbaijani control of the
region would most likely result in large scale discriminatory effects against
the Armenian population.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is a secular state with a majority Shi'a Muslim population
and of Western Turkic descent, known as Azerbaijanis, or simply Azeris. 62
Azerbaijan sits at the banks of the Caspian Sea, bordering Armenia, Iran,
Russia, and Georgia.63 The country claims to be a democracy, but is lead
with strong authoritarian rule by Ilham Aliyev, the son of the former presi-
dent. 64 Azerbaijan's capital of Baku is regarded as the economic hub of the
Caucasus due to its large oil reserves and geographic position.
65
5' http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/ADC/news.asp?id= 1907.
60 See CARLEY, supra note 4.
61 See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
62 CIA, The World Factbook: Azerbaijan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/aj.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2007).
63 id.
64 Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan Elections and After: Introduction,
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/azerbaijanI 105/1 .htm#_Toc120082498 (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
65 CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 13, at 394.
8
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol7/iss2/6
[Vol. 7: 2, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
Azerbaijan has exhibited many facets of corruption and lack of freedom
in its policies. For example, the Azerbaijani government persecutes those
who it perceives to be critical of its policies. 66 Furthermore, there have been
many allegations of voter fraud and intimidation which have undermined the
integrity of its elections. 67 This has led to the Azerbaijani people having lit-
tle influence in the activities of the government and the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.
Azerbaijan is home to a large reserve of oil; about sixty percent of the
territory is oil rich, eighty percent of which lies by the Caspian Sea. Thus,
Azerbaijan is self-sufficient in most of its energy supply, although it has re-
cently relied on Iran, Turkmenistan and Russia for its natural gas needs. 69
"Oil, therefore, is the cornerstone of Azerbaijan's newly acquired statehood
and the key to its viability." 70 Armenian forces control many of the regions
close to the oil pipelines, and as a result the interests of Azerbaijan in main-
taining security and stability in the flow of oil is compromised by the Arme-
nian presence in those regions.
7 1
Azerbaijan's policy towards Karabakh has always been to maintain ter-
ritorial integrity in the region without compromising the interests of Azer-
baijan. 72 Furthermore, Azerbaijan aims at maintaining and advancing its oil
interests in the region. 73 The Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline has secured a
means of transporting oil out of the region. 74 The pipeline bypasses Arme-
nia and has opened itself up to the instability of the Georgian state and Kurd-
ish populated regions of Turkey. 75 The politics of the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan
pipeline play a large role in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict because
such a substantial portion of the Azerbaijani economy delends on oil; some
four billion dollars have been invested into the project. Those who cur-
rently control the regions where oil flows and the surrounding areas have the
ability to disrupt the pipelines, they have a significant influence in the profit-
66 EU-South Caucasus, supra note 5 1.
67 Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijan: Run-Up to Election Not Free or Fair,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/3 i/azerbaI1943.htm (last visited March 10, 2006)
68 BULENT GOKAY,THE POLITICS OF CASPIAN OIL 110 (2001).
6 9 
id.
' ld. at I I.
7" Id. at 112.
72 Author's analysis.
73 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
74 MUSTAFA AYDIN, TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 134 (2003).
75 See infra App. Fig. 2.
76 Author's analysis.
303
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abilit 7 of the pipeline, and in turn adversely affect the Azerbaijani econ-
omy.
Azerbaijan's main ally is Turkey, however it is striving to develop
closer relations with the West.78 Azerbaijan seeks to further establish Turk-
ish and American influence on the East-West corridor, which would de-
crease the influence of Iran and Russia in the region. 79 Azerbaijan has been
succeeding in developing interests with the West mainly because of the
United States' goal of decreasing its reliance on Saudi oil. 8° The prospect of
a new source of oil from the region via the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline has driven
the United States to adopt policies favoring Azerbaijan. 81
Azerbaijan has been unwilling to reach a peaceful settlement in recent
talks with Armenia. 82  Given the large profitability of the Baku-Tiblisi-
Ceyhan pipeline, which has not begun to operate at full capacity, Aliyev
might be holding out to reap the profits of the pipeline and build up the
Azerbaijani military. A buildup of the military would allow Aliyev to
launch an offensive to reclaim Nagorno-Karabakh.
8 3
Outside of the strategic and profitable interests, Azerbaijan is also con-
cerned with the large amount of Azerbaijani refugees that have been dis-
placed outside of Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of the war. 84 Present nego-
17 See Emin Makhmudov & Mikhail Zygar, Revolutions in the Pipeline, Caspian Oil Will Fill Up
the Boku-Jeikhan Pipeline, KOMMERSANT, May 25, 2005, available at
http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=580345; see also Yigal Schleifer, Pipeline Politics give
Turkey and EdgeTHE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 25, 2005, available at
http://csmonitor.com/2005/0525/p06s0l-woeu.html. Azerbaijan does not want to lose the support
they have worked for in developing the pipeline. The significant investment by the United States
and Great Britain have been largely due to interests of oil in the region. If instability and lose of
significant land plagues Azerbaijan foreign investors will be more hesitant in pumping money into
Azerbaijan and developing its oil interests. Id.
78 See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 13, at 394.
7' See CORNELL, SMALL NATIONS, supra note 13, at 394.
so Author analysis.
8 Author analysis.
82 Azerbaijan's Aliyev Says Karabakh Talks At 'Dead End',
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/e3bffcb4-85c I -408d-8d4d-046c668I8487.html (last
visited March 10, 2006).
83 Vartan Oskanian, Old States and New: Shifting Paradigms and the Complex Road to Peace in
Nagorny Karabakh, in THE LIMITS OF LEADERSHIP: ELITES AND SOCIETIES IN THE NAGORNY
KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS, (Laurence Broers ed., 2005), available at http://www.c-
r.org/accord/norgany-karabakh/contents.php.
84 MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., THE OSCE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY: CONFLICT
PREVENTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 473 (1997). "The
safe return of the refugees is a major issue in the negotiations." At present there are 380,000 Arme-
nian and approximately one million Azeri refugees (of which 200,000 come from Armenia, 45,000
from Nagorno-Karabakh and about 750,000 from the parts of Azerbaijan occupied by Karabakh-
Armenian troops). Id. The UN has also estimated that about one million Azeri refugees have been
10
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tiation efforts mainly focus on the safe return of Azerbaijani refugees from
the occupied territories around Nagomo-Karabakh and a few areas in the re-
gion. 85 Azerbaijan aims at achieving a safe return of these refugees with
citizenship rights to Nagorno-Karabakh; however, this will be a hard task
given the decade they have spent outside their homes and the amount of de-
struction and reconstruction in the region.
86
Secondary Parties
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Minsk Group
(OSCE)
Although not an independent state itself, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), initially called the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), holds a crucial role in the settlement
of the Karabakh conflict. 87 It has fifty participating states from Europe, the
Mediterranean, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and North America.
88
The OSCE Minsk Group was a group established by the OSCE to main-
tain security and be a coordinating organization. 89  The Minsk Group is
headed by the Co-Chairmanship consisting of France, the Russian Federa-
tion and the United States. "Furthermore, the Minsk Group also includes the
following participating States: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan." 90
Nagorno-Karabakh participates at the meetings as an interested party." 9 1
The OSCE leads all the negotiation efforts in the conflict. 92 "[A]lthough the
negotiations have provided opportunities to test a series of formulas that
displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, AZERBAIJAN: A COUNTRY
STUDY 97 (2004), available at http://rs6.loc.go/frd/cs/aztoc.html.
85 BOTHE, supra note 84, at 473.
86 See BOTHE, supra note 84.
87 Jacoby, supra note 41. "The CSCE took the first steps to transform itself into the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE - the name was changed only in December 1994) in an
attempt to address issues of common interest in what may now appear a naive spirit of mutual trust
and shared values prevailing over narrow national interests." Id.
88 Id.
89 id.
98 http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/2002/13503.htm.
91 BOTHE, supra note 84, at 465.
92 id.
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might still be useful in achieving a solution, the OSCE mediation has failed
to bring a solution."
93
The OSCE has developed a twofold task in the Nagorno-Karabakh con-
flict: "firstly, to mediate, facilitate and support a peaceful settlement of the
Nagom[o]-Karabakh conflict, and secondly to negotiate relations between its
participating states and determine the role of the [O]SCE and, specifically,
the Minsk Process within it."
' 9 4
The OSCE brings together the interests of the parties mentioned below,
and each participant in the OSCE negotiation process exhibits some influ-
ence in the talks and the eventual settlement to the conflict. The Minsk
Process negotiations will be discussed below in the negotiations attempt sec-
tion.
Turkey
Turkey has a long history of conflict with Armenia, including the Ar-
menian Genocide, recent denial of the Armenian genocide, an economic
blockade of Armenia, and refusal to normalize relations with Armenia. "The
only country that constantly expressed its support for Azerbaijan is Turkey.
In all international fora Turkey has tried to explain and promote the Azeri
view of the conflict, and has certainly been instrumental in preventing a pro-
Armenian approach from totally dominating these fora." 95 Turkey has been
the closest ally of Azerbaijan, being the first to recognize its status as an in-
dependent state and provide support to the new government. 96 Furthermore,
Turkey has been accused of providing arms in small amounts to Azerbaijan
to help in the Karabakh war efforts. 9  Turkey is in direct competition with
Russia and Iran for influence in the Caucuses. 98 A major source of Turkish
support for Azerbaijan stems from the notion of Pan-Turkism, which is the
belief that Turkic people should unite into a single unified state. 99 In this
13 Gerald J. Libaridian, The Elusive 'Right Formula' At The 'Right Time': A Historical Analysis Of
The Official Peace Process, in THE LIMITS OF LEADERSHIP: ELITES AND SOCIETIES IN THE
NAGORNY KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS, (Laurence Broers ed., 2005), available at http://vww.c-
r.org/accord/nagomy-karabakh/elusive-right-formaula.php.
94 See Jacoby, supra note 41.
" Svante E. Cornell, Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance, in 34
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 51, 51-72 (1998), availatle at
http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/cornell-pub/tfopol.pdf [hereinafter Cornell, Turkey].
96 See Cornell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 60.
97 BOTHE, supra note 84, at 468.
98 BOTHE, supra note 84, at 468. Turkey holds a seven percent interest in the Azeri oil consortium.
Id.
"9 See generally SWIETOCHOWSKi, TADEUSZ, RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN 33 (1995); see Wikipedia,
Pan-Turkism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-Turkism (last visited March 10, 2006). The move-
ment is closely related to Turanism which preaches a unity of Turkic people. "The first step toward
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regard Turkey has interests in advancing Azerbaijani interests in the Kara-
bakh conflict because a unified Azerbaijan would bring it a step closer to a
unified "Turan."
However, Turkey was and is constrained in its foreign policy from pro-
viding direct military support to Azerbaijan. 100 First, the still influential
doctrine of Kemalism prevents Turkey from involving itself with the conflict
of other countries except in limited circumstances. 01 Second, Turkey's
close relationship with western countries prohibits it from directly involving
itself in the crisis because Western countries do not want to escalate the con-
flict.'°2 Third, Russia's role in the region and Turkish economic and politi-
cal affairs prevents Turkey from taking a direct adversarial role.'0 3 Fourth,
Turkey's membership in NATO plays a major role in its constraint from
providing direct support to Azerbaijan; an escalation of the conflict could
lead to other members having to enter the war. 104 Finally, Turkey itself does
not want an escalation of the war because an escalation of the war will lead
to Russia and Iran being involved in the conflict which would diminish the
role Turkey plays in the Caucuses.' 
05
Russia
Russia is a large and powerful player in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
because both Azerbai an and Armenia were part of the Soviet Union before
the conflict erupted. i 6  Russia considers the Caucuses within its direct
sphere of influence and does not want to lose its dominant role in the con-
flict. 107  Russian forces were reported to have helped Armenian forces in
this goal [Pan-Turkism] would be the creation of a literary idiom that served all Turks, from the Bal-
kans to the great Wall of China." SWIETOCHOWSKI, supra note 99, at 33. Turkey has provided fi-
nancial support to Azerbaijan to convert its language into the Latin alphabet like modem Turkish.
Cornell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 60.
100 Id.
'0' Comell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 63. The limited situations that Turkey can involve itself in the
conflict of other countries are "the Turks on Cyprus, and perhaps the Mosul area of Northern Iraq."
/d.
102 Cornell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 64.
103 Cornell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 65. "The total volume of trade between the two countries
ranges between United States S three to four billion; in 1992 Turkey's trade with Russia was five
times larger than its trade with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states combined." Id.
104 1d.
105 BOTHE, supra note 84, at 468.
1061id.
107 GOKAY, supra note 68, at 187.
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certain skirmishes and delivered arms to Armenian troops in Karabakh.10 8
Russia does not like the OSCE's influence in the region and their leading
role in the negotiations; rather, they would prefer to see a "Russian only"
mediation lead by Russian peacekeepers. Russia was pivotal in the cease-
fire agreement reached in 1994, and they would like to further strengthen
their stronghold in the negotiations to achieve and promote their interests. "1
0
Russia's interests in the Caucuses are numerous and deep. Russia wants
to keep its dominant role in the region and control the transportation of Cas-
pian oil and natural gas. I"' Furthermore, the increased production of oil
from a stronger Azerbaijan may weaken Russia's role in world petroleum
trade. Influence over the Caucuses is also important for Russia's security
because of the potential for numerous separatist movements from its Turkic
populations. 112 A strong Armenian state between Azerbaijan and Turkey
will provide a buffer zone and block the goal at a unified Turkic bloc span-
ning from Istanbul to Baku. 113 Over 10 million Russians live in the Cau-
cuses; thus, the Russian government feels responsible for the Russian popu-
lation in the region."l 4 Russia also seeks
[T]o prevent Turkey or Iran from getting a foothold in the Caucasus
through Azerbaijan, [and] to have Russian troops in the Republic, guarding
the 'common CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] border' with Iran
and Turkey just like it does in Armenia and Georgia (Azerbaijan is the only
Transcaucasian state not to have any Russian troops on its soil).""15
Russia does not want Azerbaijan to be a powerful player in the Cau-
cuses since Azerbaijan has the potential to be the regional powerhouse." 16
Reports have indicated that Russia has provided military support to both
countries to play each side against each other thereby keeping each side
weak and occupied. 117 Recently Russia has tried to strengthen relations with
Azerbaijan; however,
Russia is able to offer Azerbaijan nothing because Russia doesn't want
Azerbaijan to be strong, to be independent and to escape from occupation of
108 Id.
"o9 Cornell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 58.
"o Jacoby, supra note 41.
1 GOKAY, supra note 68, at 187. Russia is not interested in the oil in the region because it has large
reserves of its own. Id.
112 GOKAY, supra note 68, at 187.
113 MILLER, supra note 36, at 70.
14 GOKAY, supra note 68, at 187.
15 Cornell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 8.
116 Robert Parsons, Analysis: Putin Seeks To Draw Azerbaijan Back Into Russian Orbit, RADIO FREE
EUROPE (Feb. 21, 2006) at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/0335ec2e-489b-4be6-b5fD-
f52d0c96226b.html.
117 MILLER, supra note 36, at 70.
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its territory.. .Russia is able to propose some support maybe in the liberation
of one or two regions but the price is very big: it is the independence of
Azerbaijan." 1 8
Putin has expressed that he would like Russian peacekeepers to be pre-
sent in and around Karabakh in case a peace deal with Armenia is reached,
thereby maintaining his influence in the region. 119
United States of America
The United States' policy towards Azerbaijan and Armenia since in the
1990's and currently has been a policy of mixed interests and goals.120 Ar-
menia enjoys good relations with the United States; it receives one of the
highest per capita foreign aid from the United States and has received a mul-
titude of support in the development of its democracy.' Furthermore, the
Armenian lobby in the United States was successful in passing Section 907
of the Freedom from Russia and Emerging Eurasia Democracies and Open
Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act which prevented the United States gov-
ernment from sending aid to Azerbaijan as long as it maintained an eco-
nomic blockade of Armenia. 122 However, this section of the act was waived
by the President after September 11, 2001 to garner support for the "War on
Terror."' 123 The White House has consistently tried to strengthen ties with
Azerbaijan after September 11h because of its close proximity to Afghani-
stan and Iran. Azerbaijan provides airspace which the United States can use
for its missions in the region. 124
Currently, there are four essential pillars of U.S. military interests in
Azerbaijan, comprising broad areas of security driven by the new demands
of waging a global war on terror. The first two focus on the general goals of
fostering regional stability and security and forging cooperative assistance in
countering terrorism. The third and fourth pillars comprise countering the
proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and
"8 Parsons, supra note 119.
119 Id.
120 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
121 Fed. Research Div, supra note 52, at 145.
122 GOKAY, supra note 68, at 194.
123 Transcript of the interview of Ambassador John Evans with Armenia TV station (Jan. 21, 2005)
http://www.usa.am/news/2005/january/news012405.html.
124 Shannon O'Lear, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Uni'ed States: Power Shift in the Caucasus or
Business as Usual?, available at http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/S&Ps/2002-Su/S&P-
Su2002/arm azerandUS.html.
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maintaining access to the Caucasus air corridor, which is essential for pro-
jecting power into Central Asia and Afghanistan. 125
Oil is the major reason why there has been increased support for Azer-
baijan in the 21"t century. The United States wants to maintain its relations
with Azerbaijan and keep the region peaceful given the substantial invest-
ment of United States firms in the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and the potential of
a new rich oil source thus, allowing oil to flow undisturbed. 126 The Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline runs very close to the Armenian-controlled regions of
Karabakh; therefore, any conflict there might be a danger to the pipeline and
its operations. United States policy also favors developing new pipelines out
of the Caspian to further enhance the transportation capacity of the oil. 1
27
Armenia's growing relationship with Iran is another point of interest for
the United States. "Iran can provide Armenia with significant economic ties
and energy and act as a political counterweight to Turkey and Turkish influ-
ence in the region." 128 The United States would not like to see this relation-
ship develop, but rather maintain ties with Armenia so it is not forced into a
relationship with Iran. Growth possibilities with Iran only strengthen the
Iranian state, which the United States wants to keep weak.
In general, United States foreign policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict is not firm.129 The official foreign policy supports the territorial in-
tegrity of Azerbaijan, but is influenced heavily by the Armenia lobby in the
United States. 130 The United States has mainly played a mediating role in
the conflict while recently providing financial support to both sides. F31 Con-
gress has also given aid directly to the Nagorno-Karabakh government al-
though official policy does not recognize it as a state.1
3 2
Iran
Logic would dictate that Iran would be a major supporter of Azerbaijan
given their common religion and close cultures. 33 However, Iran has be-
come an ally of Armenia given the various interests Iran wants to further and
125 Richard Giragosian, Nagorno-Karabakh: Peace May Depend On Military Situation, available at
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/b 1317838-a67a-47d8-8f24-61 dba3680448.html.
126 O'Lear, supra note 124.
127 Id.
128 id.
1
29 
Id.
130 id.
131 Id.
132 Transcript, supra note 123.
133 Cornell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 58. "Iran is an Islamic fundamentalist state, of Shi'i denomina-
tion like a majority of the Azeris, and furthermore has a numerous Azeri population, estimated at 15-
20 million-several times larger than the Azerbaijani republic's population." Id.
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Armenia's willingness to ally with Iran.134 Not only has Iran supported Ar-
menia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, but it has recently made numerous en-
ergy agreements where Iran would provide natural gas to Armenia. 135 Most
recently, Iran and Armenia opened up a key gas pipeline that will allow Ar-
menia to import natural gas from Iran and ease its strong dependence on
Russian energy resources.' 36 Furthermore, Iran and Armenia are in talks to
build an oil refinery in Armenia along the Iran-Armenia border, which
would allow Armenia to directly import oil via pipeline and increase the re-
finery capabilities of Iran. 1
37
Iran has many interests in wanting Azerbaijan to remain weak in the re-
gion. First, the growth of the Azerbaijani economy would decrease the
strong hold that Iran has on oil in the region.138 Iran does not want to lose- , 139
its dominant position on the export of petroleum. Second, because Iran
has a large Azeri minority living within its borders, a strong unified Azerbai-
jan might incite separatist movements within Iran. Iran and Armenia are
both concerned over Azeri national movements and aims at reunification of
Azeris who are separated by the Azerbaijani-Iran border. 140
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT ATTEMPTS
First Attempts
The Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan were the first to attempt a set-
tlement process for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1991; however, these
114 Id. at 59.
135 Id.
136 http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeniareport/report/en/2007/03/C72E2866-3 145-4780-92D1 -
4157576CD348.ASP.
137 http://www.armenialiberty.org/armeniareport/report/en/2007/04/E580653A-9925-49A3-99CF-
97EC752D9973.ASP.
Despite its vast oil reserves, Iran lacks refining capacities and has to import gasoline to meet
domestic demand. Nonetheless, some Russian experts have questioned the economic wisdom of the
project, arguing that oil refineries are usually located near sea ports or major oil pipelines. They see
political motives behind the idea of building such a facility in landlocked Armenia. Id.
138 Cornell, Turkey, supra note 95, at 59.
139 id.
140 O'Lear, supra note 124. "There are also approximately two hundred thousand Armenians living
in Iran. Iran and Armenia continue to expand cooperation in areas of economic activity, transport
and energy despite opposition from both the United States and Russia to increased Iranian influence
in the region." Id.
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talks were not successful. 14 1 Russia then launched initiatives with Iran to
bring together the parties, which were successful for small intervals of cease
fires but no permanent resolution was reached. 1
42
The Minsk Process
In 1992 the OSCE, then called the CSCE, agreed to form what was
called the Minsk process with hopes that the group would meet in Minsk,
Belarus where the parties would reach a peaceful settlement. 143 As prob-
lems surfaced over the many complicated issues in the conflict, the Minsk
meeting was indefinitely postponed, but the Minsk Group was formed with
the eleven OSCE countries.14 4  Russia kept a low profile in the Minsk
Group, which was created to diminish the influence of Russia in the settle-
ment of the crisis. 145 Furthermore, Russia played a dual role in the negotia-
tions, as both a Minsk Group member and a dominant regional actor.
146
Outside of the Minsk Group negotiations Russia took it on its own accord to
establish negotiations between the parties. 147 Given the different foras avail-
able to the parties, they took advantage of the situation and were involved in
"forum shopping" and "mediator shopping." 148 This undermined the efforts
of the Minsk Group and allowed other organizations, like the United Na-
tions, to be involved.
49
During the Budapest Summit in December 1994 the Minsk Group estab-
lished a co-chairmanship process and Russia joined Sweden as then co-
chairman. 150 Russia continued on its quest for independent negotiations and
was able to broker a cease-fire agreement independent of the Minsk Group
on May 12, 1994.'5 1 However, this cease-fire agreement was mostly the re-
sult of the Azerbaijani defeat on the battlefield rather than Russia's influence
over the negotiations. 52
141 BOTHE, supra note 84, at 469.
142 ld.
143 Jacoby, supra note 41.
'" Id. "Apart from the parties to the conflict the current Minsk Group members are Belarus, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and the United States."
Hakala, Terhi, The OSCE Minsk Process: A balance after five year, 9 HELSINKI MONTITOR 5
(1998), available at http://www.nhc.nl/hm/1998/voll/Hakala98- I.pdf.
145 BOTHE, supra note 84, at 469.
146 Jacoby, supra note 41.
147 Hakala, supra note 144, at 6.
"' Id. at 8.
149 id.
150 Id.
151 BOTHE, supra note 84, at 470.
152 id.
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In subsequent years different strategies of co-chairmanships were at-
tempted but none proved to be anymore effective than the other. 75 A sum-
mit was held in Lisbon in December of 1996, which eventually strengthened..... . 154 Th
Azerbaijan's position and switched the roles in the negotiations. Three
principles were set out for the resolution of the dispute one of which was the
"affirmation of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-
Karabakh,"' 155 which isolated Armenia and led Karabakh to proclaim that it
was not ready to deal with Azerbaijan. 56 France was also nominated to be.. . 157
co-chair of the group with Russia. However, in 1997 Azerbaijan ex-
pressed much dissatisfaction in France's nomination due to the large Arme-
nian population in France and the bias France might bring to the negotia-
tions; therefore, the United States was nominated as third co-chair of the
158group.
The Fall of Ter-Petrosian and New Negotiations
Former President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosian, softened his posi-
tion on Karabakh after the Lisbon Summit.159 He conceded that the interna-
tional community would never recognize the autonomy of Nagomo-
Karabakh, and that Armenia had to use a step-by-step negotiation process
while keeping the interests of Karabakh in mind. I Armenians in Karabakh
expressed dismay at the new negotiation terms and were not ready to with-
draw from the occupied territories. Ter-Petrosian eventually resigned his
position and current President Robert Kocharian, the former president of
Nagorno-Karabakh, was elected President of Armenia. 161
153 Hakala, supra note 144, at 9-10.
154 THOMAS DE WAAL, BLACK GARDEN: ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN THROUGH PEACE AND WAR
256 (2004).
155 DE WAAL, supra note 154, at 256.
156 Hakala, supra note 144, at 8.
157 DE WAAL, supra note 154, at 258.
158 id.
159 Id. at 259.
160 Id. The so-called 'step-by-step' solution, proposed in September 1997, was premised on sealing
Agreement I first before dealing with Agreement II, with the question of the Lachin corridor linking
Nagorn[o]-Karabakh with Armenia moved to Agreement II. Nagomy Karabakh would continue to
exist in its present form until agreement on final status was reached, but would gain internationally
recognized 'interim status'. In principle the step-by-step solution would build a constructive atmos-
phere in the early stages focused on military aspects, paving the road for negotiations on the more
complex political issues. Jacoby, supra note 41.
161 DE WAAL, supra note 154, at 260-61.
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In November 1998 a common state plan was offered that encompassed
"a vaguely defined common state between Azerbaijan and Nagorn[o]-
Karabakh, featuring more or less 'horizontal' relations between Baku and
Stepanakert."' 62 This plan was rejected by Azerbaijan on the grounds that it
violated territorial integrity and the principles adopted at the Lisbon sum-
mit. 163 From 1998 to the Washington summit of 1999 there was a cold
peace leriod where Azerbaijan strengthened its ties with the United
States. During the Washington summit Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev
met with Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Georgian President Edu-
ard Shevardnadze. 65 Madeline Albright left President Kocharian and Ali-
yev to talk amongst each other in privacy; this was the first time the presi-
dents had met each other face to face in six years. 166 Almost by accident,
Secretary of State Albright had developed a new form of high level negotia-
tions that eventually led to the subsequent meetings between the two. 167 Af-
ter these meetings Armenia went through much political turmoil because of
internal conflict and the assassination of the Prime Minister by extremists,
which put the peace process on hold until Armenia's domestic policies were
sorted out. 
168
Key West Talks
Before the Key West talks, Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev met in
Paris twice, led by President Jacques Chirac.1 69 The international scene
seemed to be set for a resolution to be reached; the co-chairs of the Minsk
Group had been reaching compromises and the Presidents Aliyev and Ko-
charian had constant dialogue. In April 2001, the United States Department
of State organized a five day meeting in Key West, Florida. 170 These talks
were the highest level talks to date and encompassed the negotiation of the
heads of state and the leadership of Minsk Group negotiators. The parties
stated that they reached a deal about eighty to ninety percent complete. The
deal included the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia and the land
162 Jacoby, supra note 41.
163 id.
164 See DE WAAL, supra note 154, at 262.
165 Id. at 263.
166id.
167 id.
168 Id. at 264-66.
169 Id. at 267.
170 DE WAAL, supra note 154.
171 id.
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mass that separated Nagomo-Karabakh from Armenia prior to the war. 172 In
exchange for the unification of Armenia and Karabakh, Armenia would pro-
vide a corridor to Nakhichevan through the Meghri region which would al-
low Azerbaijan to have direct access to Turkey. 173 Furthermore, all Azeri
refugees would have the right to return to non-annexed territories and "sig-
nificant foreign aid would be provided to Azerbaijan paying for the reinte-
gration or resettlement of Azeri refugees."
1 74
Although the settlement seemed almost complete in the minds of the
Presidents, they faced extreme opposition to the settlement plan back in their
home countries. In Armenia, the parliament rejected the plan because Kara-
bakh's status was non-negotiable. 175 In Azerbaijan Aliyev was met with
much stronger opposition. Azerbaijanis did not agree with the hand over of
Nagomo-Karabakh to Armenia, given Aliyev's prior strong position of not
sacrificing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.' 76  Therefore, the settle-
ment terms agreed to at Key West quickly fell through and the parties were
back to square one.
Post Key- West and Rambouillet Rounds
After the Key West summit, negotiation talks were put on hold while
President Aliyev's health continued to deteriorate. As he was transferred to
a hospital in Cleveland, Ohio, it became clear that his time was coming to an
end. In wake of this development, the Azerbaijani parliament appointed his.... 177
son Ilham Aliyev as prime minister. Right before the death of his father,
Ilham Aliyev was elected President in an election plagued with voter
fraud. 178 As the years progressed, there seemed to be no compromise in
sight as President Ilham Aliyev took a fierce position on Karabakh and dis-
missed any claims at the unification of Karabakh and Armenia. 179 Further-
72 DAVID L. PHILLIPS, UNSILENCING THE PAST: TRACK Two DIPLOMACY AND TURKISH-ARMENIAN
RECONCILIATION 84 (2005).
173 id.
174 Id.
175 DE WAAL, supra note 154, at 267.
176 Id. As one Western diplomat explained it, Aliev was basically a control freak: "He either wants
Karabakh back properly or not at all." Id.
177 Chronology, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/ accord/nagorny-karabakh.php (last visited Sep. 16,
2006).
178 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
179 id.
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more, tensions arose between the two sides as an Armenian lieutenant was
brutally axed to death during a NATO sponsored training mission. 180
As tensions increased and there were numerous violations of the cease-
fire agreement at the borders, and the prospect of peace seemed slim until
the meetings at Rambouillet, France. Much of the negotiations at the Ram-
bouillet rounds depended on the military situation on the ground. 18 There
were high expectations from the talks in Rambouillet because the sentiment
around the world was that an agreement was close to being finalized; how-
ever, the talks ended in no immediate solutions to the conflict. 182 Further-
more, both sides have toughened their positions on Karabakh after Ram-
bouillet; Aliyev has stated that the talks are at a "dead end" and Kocharian
has hinted at officially recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh and strengthening the
military "if Aliyev drops out of further negotiations." 83
Recent Efforts at a Resolution
President Robert Kocharian and iham Aliyev met with mediators in
Bucharest between June 4-5, 2006.184 Many different solutions were pro-
posed; however, both Presidents did not stray away from their hard stance
positions even with pressure from mediators. 85 The principles proposed at
the Bucharest meetings were for a gradual settlement, concluding with a ref-
erendum in Karabakh on the territory's status. i86 The main point of dis-
agreement between the parties were the terms of the referendum. i87 Presi-
dent Aliyev purportedly feels that any legitimization of Armenian control of
Karabakh will compromise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. 188
The Presidents of the two countries met once again in November of
2006 in Minsk."' These confidential talks were only signaled by positive
reactions from the Azeri standpoint and neutral statements from the Armeni-
180 Armenian National Committee of America, Reps. Schiff Pallone & Knollenberg Speak Out
Against Brutal Slaying of Armenian Soldier,
http://www.anca.org/press-releases/press-releases.php?prid=515 (last visited Sep. 16, 2006).
181 Giragosian, supra note 128.
182 Ashot Beglarian, Karabakh: Peace Deal Doubts,
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=260194&apc-state=henh (last visited Sep. 16, 2006).
183 Julie A. Corwin, U.S.: Minsk Group Fails To Produce Results On Nagorno-Karabakh, RADIO
FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Mar 9. 2006, at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/ accord/nagomy-
karabakh.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
184 Emil Danielyan, Armenia, Azerbaijan Again Fail To Break Karabakh Deadlock, (June 8, 2006)
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav060806.shtml#.
185 Id.
186 ld.
187 id.
188 Id.
189 http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/12/3f26c60e-daa2-4fbd-aOI9-054e5l953l e7.html.
22
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol7/iss2/6
[Vol. 7: 2, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
ans. 90 The only comments made by the Armenian Foreign minister were
that "both presidents assessed the meeting as positive in terms of atmosphere
and constructive approaches."' 9 1 However, President Aliyev pointed to
agreement on a few major issues. 192
The Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan have met on numer-
ous occasions in 2006 and 2007 trying to draw upon the past commitments
made by both parties. Most notably, the two met in Moscow with American,
Russian, and French mediators where there were small productive steps to-
wards a resolution. 193 Recently, the Armenian Foreign Ministers has sig-
naled at the prospect of a resolution and his optimism towards a peaceful set-
tlement. 194  However, President Aliyev has maintained his position in
maintaining the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and has continued his
threats at a military solution to reclaim the territories. 195
WHAT Is NEXT?
Given the close proximity of either an escalation in the conflict or fi-
nally a peaceful settlement in the Karabakh conflict, it is difficult to deter-
mine the adequate course of action needed to reach a peaceful settlement.
Some twelve years of negotiations have resulted in nothing but stalemates
and intensification of attitudes over the crisis. The longer the stalemate con-
tinues, the harder it will be for the refugees to return to their homes in the
occupied territories outside of Karabakh, and on the other side, the ability of
Azerbaijan to exercise control over Karabakh. Elongating the conflict will
serve against both parties' interests. Once the Karabakh Armenians have
tasted freedom it will be hard to turn back the clock and put them under
Azerbaijani or Armenian rule. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia,
Vartan Oskanian has stated:
The solution will not be found either through military action or intera-
tional resolutions, and no solution can be imposed from the outside. The
only way to a solution is to demonstrate political will and embrace real-
istic positions. Armenians remain faithful to their initial premises that
there cannot be a vertical link between Azerbaijan and Nagom[o] Kara-
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 id.
193 http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/ADC/news.asp?id= 1966.
194 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SiD/RMOl-72CMJZ?OpenDocument.
195 http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewslD= 11432900&PageNum = 0 .
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bakh, that it must have a geographic link with Armenia, and that the se-
curity of the people of Nagorn[o] Karabakh must be assured.
For us, the basis of resolution is the affirmation of the right of the people
of Nagorn[o] Karabakh to self-determination and international recogni-
tion of that right. Azerbaijan's acceptance of this fact - and its formal-
ization in an agreement - will open the way for the resolution of the
conflict and the elimination of its consequences. 196
There needs to be a solution to this conflict in the near future, as the situa-
tions of the Azeri refugees and Karabakh Armenians are not getting better.
Both sides should be willing to concede certain points to be able to accom-
plish a solution.
Ultimately, a negotiated solution depends on three factors: the degree of
urgency felt by the parties to the conflict to reach a solution; sufficient po-
litical capital held by their leaders to sell a compromise solution to publics
used to hard-line rhetoric; and the combined and determined support of re-
gional and international players to support such a solution. The two alterna-
tives to a negotiated solution - a renewal of hostilities or a solution imposed
through forceful action by the major powers - cannot be attractive to either
party. 
97
The framework has been laid down by both the Key West talks and the
Ramboullet rounds, and it is clear that both sides need to make major con-
cessions in order to garner a peace deal. Armenia does not want to give up
its only route to Iran because it needs an outlet for trade; and Azerbaijan
does not want to compromise its territorial integrity in any way. These con-
flicting interests have made it impossible for the conflict to reach a resolu-
tion.
During my visit to the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, I encountered a
common sentiment amongst the people: control will not be surrendered to
Azerbaijan under any terms. Even the mention of a return Azeri rule to any
of the residents would be met by quick dismissal and impossibility. Azer-
baijan cannot continue to maintain its hard stance to regain control of the re-
gion and continue with its threats of violence. The settlement of the conflict
is pivotal for the continued development and prosperity of Armenia as a
whole; thus, Azerbaijan is hesitant to propose a settlement that would give
control to Armenia. On the other hand, Armenia is constricted by its corrupt
officials that continue to benefit from the continuity of the conflict. The
conflict needs to be resolved so that all people of the Caucuses can all ex-
perience prosperity and security. Azerbaijan has to realize that control of the
region is beyond its reach now and that the further economic development of
196 Oskanian, supra note 83.
197 Libaridian, supra note 17.
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Azerbaijan is based on an equitable settlement to both parties. Thus, it is es-
sential for each people groups to realize that the conflict will only worsen
and intensify the hatred for the each other if certain concessions are not ac-
cepted and worked into a settlement agreement.
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Appendix
Figure 1
Territories under Armenian control in dark grey.
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Figure 2
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